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Figure 2. CGRO Flight Propulsion Subsystem
The propulsion subsystem consisted of A-side and fully redundant B-side sets of thrusters, feed system components and propellant tanks.
As will be seen, it is significant that this design featured functional redundancy _ith fault isolation capability.
Crossover isolation valves permitted full utilization of propellant and provided capability for center-of-mass management by control of the quantity of propellant used from each tank. Details of the design and development of the CGRO propulsion subsystem ,sere given in a previous paper 3.
The mission tasks for the propulsion subsystem were to provide:
• Orbital altitude restoration (drag make up)
• Attitude control during reboost
• Descent for refueling and on-orbit servicing • Ascent (from STS servicing orbits)
• Descent for STS retrteval or controlled reentry • Provide sate hold operating mode in event of loss of gyroscope stabilization. The system was designed to operate in a pressure blo_do_,n mode over a range of 400 to 87 psia. The four 4_t() N OATs were to be fired simultaneously to provide AV impulse tbr orbit altitude change, orbit maintenance, descent for refueling, ascent and controlled reentry. The
OATs '_ere placed on the spacecraft X and Y axes with thrust vectors parallel to the Z-axis (see Figure 2 ). The
OATs
_sere to be off-modulated to provide primary attitude control about the spacecraft pitch and roll axes during the AV firings. The 22 N ACTs were to provide primar? yax_ attitude control during operation of the OATs.
In the e_ent that one of the OATs failed during tiring, tt.,, geomemc ,_pp,_.,_te _outd be automatically shut d_),.sn and Hnpulse '._->uid c_,nttnue to be prostded by the remamln._, O-\g parr Fhe \CF_ ,,_ere c.m_cd ,tf the spacecraft Z-axis and.
.,_ncn fired appr(_prx_tc[) _r: pa_rs, could prt,;td¢ c_)ntrt)l Thrust levels and moment arms about the spacecraft center-of-mass were such that the ACTs could provide complete three-axis control at all times. They were to operate primarily in a pulse mode, but were designed for steady-state operation--a design feature that was used when they were required to backup the OATs for altitude raising.
Of particular significance to following discussions, the subsystem employed multiple latching isolation valves -,hapcd tt_ c!t_e _n a :c_hm Nng .,eal rhc _dcno,d and mm (ch_,,urei ,prIng arc hermcticall,, sealed tmm propellant b,, _'elded hclh-.'s assemblies. The spring assemhl? ctmtrolling the ba_:kpressure relief function is exposed to the fluid. A tOO-micron absolute wire mesh tilter is installed in each of the fluid ports.
A position switch assembly, v,hich electrically indicates valve position, is located at the top and is integral with the valve. Other than being damaged by above-specification overpressures during the A-side priming attempt, the latching isolation valves performed nominally during the nine years of on-orbit life. Moreover, it was this valve's beyond-specification capability to respond to millisecond-level pulse commands that ultimately provided a means to safely prime the subsystem B-side. thereby enabling the CGRO mission to continue with low risk.
PROPELLANT
LOADING SEQUENCE AND ISSUES by a partial fueling operation in June 1990 at which time 15 Ibm of hydrazine was loaded into the Aside of the system. The system was monitored for liquid leakage: none was observed and therefore launch was approved.
The partial fueling contributed to the surge problem because a different propellant loading system was used for this small mass of propellant. The loading operation was as follows. Tank AI fuel and gas fill and drain valves and isolation valves AI. A4. and A3 v, ere opened. The tank was vented and evacuated to 26 inches of mercury (Hg). The gas fill and drain valve was closed and the fuel side evacuated to "'30 inches of mercury'" (gauge resolution). 15.7 Ibm of hydrazine was loaded and the fuel fill and drain valve (FDV) closed.
The gas FDV was then opened and pressurized to 15.1 psia. Isolation ,,aires AI. A3 and A4 were then closed and the tanks pressurized to 430 psia. The system was monitored for leakage tier 5 days before depressurizing _he .&-side tanks to 25 psia.
The importance of the abo_,e operation is that the 'partial fueling" operation ut,lized a hydrazine supply %1%.k21)ill-3631 dl_llMMIn_ ,_f .l qrtaI1:4nk prc:-,nurl,:ccl t_ ";l) p,,i 7 _04 p',lA). T'hi_ tank',, -,h!raL_'ctlrrl¢ AIM h_.lndllilL_'',,,ere ,,utficlcnt tk_r the prc_pellclnt to bcct_mc full', saturated ,.'ilk nltr(/_en ,,as at 6J psla. Nitrt)gcn _:1:,,bubbles _hich e;entually fi_rmed in the propellant teed lines came from tv, o sources: residual nitrogen in the s,,stem pra_r to tilling (imperfect ,,acuuml, and nitrogen that came out of solution from the hydrazine due to depressurizing the lines to 25 psia until launch and deployment.
The system vacuum betbre loading hydrazine was estimated at 10 torr (gauge read "'30 inches "" mercury).
This yields a ',olume ratio of 1.3% ,,,,hen re-pressurized to 14.7 psia. The volume of nitrogen coming out of solution from the hydrazine is less clearly defined. First, available references tbr nitrogen solubility in hydrazine give different values.
It is also unclear how much can be redissolved.
The resultant bubble volume ratio ranges form 0.72 to 1.88%.
Overall, the combined bubble volume ratio is somewhere between 2.0 and 3.2%. This yields a bubble length of 5.9 to 9.3 cm in the lines between the tank isolation valve (A1) and the thruster isolation valves the transition Reynolds number of 2000. The lumped parameter approach appears to be sound. In a system that consists of only a pipe with high pressure at the entrance, it can be shown that closed-form solutions for the natural frequency and pressure history exist. Furthermore.
the peak pressure is predicted to be approximately two times the initial pressure difference. Such a simple system corresponds to TRW's Series I Icalibration)
tests, in which a factor of two of initial pressure difference was observed. per Figure   7 ).
The same t>pes ,,t tests ,,,,ere done _,tth h,,drazme.
The peak pressures _,,ere. as expected, slightly higher due to the difference m bulk modulus as compared to water (see Figures 8 and 0> .
In the last test using h,,drazine, performed with a AP of 375 psid. the A3 valve was closed to prevent too high a pressure peak in this part of the system. Note that at station K4 the ratio of peak pressure to initial AP was 5 for both analysis and test. as it was for other tests having lower initial :XP (50 and [00 psid) across the isolation valve.
GROUND TESTS
The CGRO propulsion subsystem on-orbit anomaly investigation included a comprehensive review of spacecraft-level ground tests, including electrical circuit testing.
No credible mechanism was identified that related errors in commands or electrical miswiring to the telemetry response observed during the A-side activation anomaly.
Supported
by the surge pressure analytical model (which was calibrated by testing) and by test data using a high fidelity mockup of the CGRO propulsion manifold, the anomaly investigation team reached the following key conclusions'_.s.6:
• Larger-than-expected bubble volume was likely left in the manifold downstream of thruster isolation valves AI, A2. A3. and A4 during propellant loading.
The primary sources for the large bubble(s) were inadequate evacuation of the propulsion system and nitrogen gas coming out of solution from the hydrazine. The analysis indicated that 2-3.2 percent (5.9-9.3 cm of line length) of the long, large diameter manifold volume may have contained bubbles.
•
Two key errors ,,,,+erecited as the cause of the large trapped bubble volume in the manifold. The first error was the use of a low resolution vacuum gauge on the propellant loading ground support equipment. pressures ,,_,ere high enough to damage the isolation ,,alve: it indicated "'closed" only after several commands were sent to close it. and it had gross leakage in the closed position following this test. This test substantiated the suspected damage to CGRO isolation valves AI and AIB and indicated the need to switch to B-side and use a modified priming sequence to avoid similar damage to isolation valve B I.
The analytical model, calibrated
with empirical data, showed that during the on-orbit priming attempt on April 7 the A-side of the CGRO propulsion subsystem had experienced peak surge pressures that ranged from 1,200 to 4,900 psia. These levels are consistent with analysis of pressure loads required to damage the bellows assemblies within the isolation valve.
After assessing the risks and benefits, a decision was made to use fast cycling of the isolation valves on the Bside manifold.
The principal advantage of the B-side manifold was that it had not been exposed to the high surge pressure. 
